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Abstract
Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous ex-
perimental studies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occur
pay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whether
bubbles can occur in markets without dividends. We investigate the
role of two features that are present in real markets. (1) The mere
possibility that some traders may have inside information, and (2) the
option to communicate with other traders. We find that bubbles can
indeed occur without dividends. Surprisingly, communication turns
out to be counterproductive for bubble formation, whereas the possi-
bility of inside information is, as expected, crucial.
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1 Introduction
Bubbles in experimental asset markets have been documented in numerous
experiments starting with the seminal paper by Smith et al. (1988). The
standard definition of a bubble used in this literature describes bubbles sim-
ply as “persistent deviations of prices from fundamentals” at high volumes of
trade (see e.g. Haruvy and Noussair, 2006).1 Robert Shiller in his book “Ir-
rational Exuberance” gives a much more colorful and descriptive definition
by describing speculative bubbles as...
“...a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor en-
thusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person
to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify
the price increases and bringing in a larger and larger class of
investors, who despite doubt about the real value of an invest-
ment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others‘ successes
and partly through a gambler‘s excitement.” (Shiller, 2005, p.2)
According to this definition, several related aspects are ingredients for
bubble formation. One crucial aspect seem to be “stories”. Those stories
often involve inside information that may or may not be true but, if true, can
justify a price change for the asset. Another aspect seems to be that those
stories are spread from “person to person”, i.e. some form of communication
is required.
In the typical asset market experiment, as pioneered by Smith et al.
(1988), bubbles occur even in a very austere environment without any of
the features mentioned by Shiller (2005). Usually one asset is traded for a
finite (often 10 or 15) number of trading “days”. After each day a stochastic
dividend is paid. Thus, the fundamental value of the asset is declining
since it is given by the expected value of the dividend times the number
of remaining periods. Nevertheless, Smith et al. observed constant or even
increasing prices followed by crashes at the end of the experiment. Their
1Similar definitions were used by Lei et al. (2001), King et al. (1993), and many others.
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experiment has been replicated many times and with a large number of
robustness checks.2
It is not easy to explain those results. A conspicuous feature of most
experiments in this literature is that the fundamental value of the asset is
declining throughout the experiment, a feature that is not typical for real
financial markets. However, a few studies (see e.g. Noussair et al. 2001; Ball
and Holt, 1998; Davies, 2006) find that bubbles may occur with constant or
even increasing fundamental values. Nevertheless, all experiments in which
bubbles occur pay dividends after each trading day. Thus, it seems that
frequent dividend payments are crucial for the emergence of bubbles in the
laboratory.
While dividend payments certainly are one possible factor to explain
bubbles in some real financial markets, they cannot account for bubbles
in many other markets. For example, many of the new economy stocks,
which experienced a tremendous bubble in 2000, never paid dividends (e.g.
Dell, Yahoo!, Oracle). Also, commodities do not pay dividends but experi-
ence bubbles nevertheless. Furthermore, for most stocks dividends are paid
out only once per year, which could only explain a very slow formation
of bubbles. Thus, it seems that dividend payments can only be a partial
explanation for the formation of bubbles in real financial markets.
The purpose of the current paper is to check whether bubbles occur in
experimental asset markets without dividend payments after each trading
day. In particular, what does it take to produce bubbles with constant
fundamental values and only a final dividend?3 Our conjecture is based
on Robert Shiller’s arguments. We propose that there are in particular two
ingredients that might matter for bubble formation: (1) The possibility that
some traders may have inside information, and (2) the possibility for traders
to communicate with each other.
We shall implement those two features in the following way. In all treat-
ments assets may pay supplements on top of the usual final dividends. The
2See Section 2.
3Prior experiments with only a final dividend suggest that in the usual austere exper-
imental environment hardly any bubbles occur (see e.g. Smith at al. (2000) and Hirota
and Sunder’s (2005) long-horizon treatment).
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possibility of inside information is implemented by the fact that in two of
our treatments (INF and INFCHAT), with a certain probability a subject
receives private information about those supplements. The second feature is
implemented in our INFCHAT treatment by the opportunity to communi-
cate with other traders through a computerized free-format chat platform.
In our experimental markets, five different assets are traded simulta-
neously.4 The purpose of this is to make the chat interesting and to give
“stock pickers” a chance to actually select something. Furthermore, it allows
to differentiate between a bubble in just one asset or a bubble involving the
entire market. Our computer interface imitates real life trading platforms
by displaying charts of asset prices after each trading day.
Our main result is that bubbles can indeed occur without intermittent
dividend payments. Crucial for this result seems to be the possibility of
inside information. Without this possibility (in our base treatment NOINF),
we find very few bubbles. With this possibility (in our treatment INF), we
find bubbles in more than half the rounds. Contrary to the intuition of
Shiller’s description, bubbles all but disappear again when we add the chat
option (in our treatment INFCHAT). Apparently, chat is counterproductive
for bubble formation. We offer some suggestions why this may be the case.
We also report a measure of overconfidence and relate the degree of
overconfidence in a group of subjects to the probability of bubbles. While
average overconfidence in the group does not seem to matter much, the
number of people, who believe that they are going to be the top-ranked
traders in a treatment, increases the probability of bubble formation.
An important issue for theories about asset bubbles is whether traders
are aware of overpricing but speculate on even higher prices to cash in or
whether traders are simply unaware of the fact that prices deviate from fun-
damental values. To check this we asked subjects to predict both, prices
at the end of the current trading day and final dividends for each asset.
If subjects are aware of mispricing and speculate, they should report div-
idend estimates equal to the fundamental value. We find that in rounds
4Most of the previous experimental literature considers only trading in one asset (see
Fisher and Kelly, 2000, and Ackert et al. (2006) for exceptions with two assets).
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in which market bubbles occur, estimates for dividends significantly exceed
fundamental values, whereas in rounds in which no bubbles occur, dividend
estimates are fairly close to fundamentals.
Our design enables us to study the tactics of a trader with inside infor-
mation (and possibly, of traders posing as such). A monopolistic insider is
facing the dilemma that he wants to profit from his information, yet when
he trades too aggressively, he will give away the information. Thus, an inter-
esting question is whether insiders will try to delude other traders through
their trading behaviors or by chatting on our chat platform. We observe,
however, few such attempts. In general, insiders trade early and late in a
round but not too aggressively. Insiders trade a lot more than non-informed
traders. Compared to the — admittedly fairly extreme — benchmark of the
maximal profit an insider could make against totally naive other traders,
insiders extract on average less than 30% of the gain they could make from
the inside information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a
selective summary of the experimental literature on asset bubbles. Section
3 introduces the experimental design of our experiment. Section 4 presents
the experimental results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is by now a large literature on bubbles in experimental asset market.
The experiments differ along a number of dimensions. For our purposes the
two most important dimensions are the frequency of dividend payments and
the shape of the fundamental value curve over time. These two dimensions
are interrelated since the fundamental value at each point in time is always
the expected value of the remaining dividend payments.
The first paper that convincingly documents bubbles in the current set-
ting is Smith et al. (1988). In their experiment there are 15 trading days
and after each day a stochastic dividend is paid. Since the expected value
of the dividend is positive, the fundamental value of the asset is declining.
Smith et al. (1988) find frequent bubbles and their finding has been
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replicated many times with a large number of robustness checks (see e.g.
King et al., 1993). Lei et al. (2001) replicate those findings even in a setting
in which resale of assets is prohibited (which makes speculation impossible).
They also reject the hypothesis that bubbles are created by subjects trading
out of boredom by providing an alternative activity for traders to engage in.
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) test and reject the hypothesis that shortsale
constraints are responsible for bubbles. Ackert et al. (2006) let subjects
trade simultaneously in two assets with the same expected payoff and find
that bubbles occur more frequently in the lottery asset, i.e. the asset that
promises a large but unlikely payoff.
There are two features that seem to prevent bubble formation. Noussair
and Tucker (2006) introduce a future market into the canonical design in
addition to the spot market and find hardly any bubbles in the spot market.
More importantly for our purposes, sufficient experience in the same market
(usually three or more rounds) reliably eliminates bubbles (see van Boening
et al., 1993). Furthermore, Dufwenberg et al. (2005) find that it is sufficient
to have a relatively small share of experienced traders (around 1/3) in the
population of traders to prevent bubbles. For this reason, we let traders in
our experiment gain experience by having three trading rounds.
All the aforementioned papers feature a falling fundamental value and
dividend payments after each trading day. When there is only a final div-
idend at the end, the fundamental value curve is flat. Smith et al. (2000)
study markets with flat fundamentals and find hardly any bubbles.5 The in-
teresting question then is, whether frequent dividend payments or decreasing
fundamental values are the driving force for bubbles. In order to separate
out this issue, Noussair et al. (2001) employ an elegant trick by using div-
idends with an expected value of zero, which allows for flat fundamentals
despite frequent dividend payments.6 They find that there are still bubbles
although less frequent than with falling fundamentals. Thus, it seems that
the main driving force for bubbles in the usual austere environment are the
5Simlarly, Hirota and Sunder (2005) use a setting with only a final dividend. They find
that with long term investors there are rarely any bubbles.
6An alternative to dividends with zero expected value is the design of Ball and Holt
(1998) with discounting. See Davies (2006) for a design with increasing fundamentals.
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frequent payments of dividends. For reasons stated above we do not believe
that this gives a compelling explanation for bubbles in real financial markets
and shall therefore consider a design without dividend payments (except a
final payment).
Another strand of the literature that is related to our paper are exper-
iments in which there is the possibility (with probability strictly less than
one) of an informed insider. The uncertainty whether there actually is some
inside information in the market creates the opportunity for real world sce-
narios in which traders have to guess whether price movements are driven by
actual information or whether they are simply seeing a “mirage”. Camerer
and Weigelt (1991) are the first authors to study this setting. They find
some but not too many instances in which such mirages occur. In particu-
lar, there are no mirages in later rounds. In contrast to Camerer and Weigelt
(1991) who consider the case of competition among insiders, Friedman and
von Borries (1988) in an unpublished pilot study consider the case of a mo-
nopolistic insider, which is close to the setting that we use in the current
paper. They find that insiders are able to earn substantially larger profits
than uninformed traders.
Finally, note that our experimental design with 5 assets and 2 supple-
ments, which give rise to a fixed expected value for the market index of all 5
assets, resembles a situation frequently encountered in prediction markets,
e.g. when contracts drawn on the vote share of candidates for political office
or the outcome of sport events are traded (see e.g. Plott and Sunder, 1988,
Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; and Berg et al., forthcoming).
3 Experimental design
3.1 Market structure
In each session 10 subjects participated in a computerized experimental asset
market, in which 5 different assets were traded simultaneously.7 Trading was
conducted in continuous time double auctions (one double auction for each
7The five assets were labeled and represented as different colors on the computer screen.
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asset).8 All 10 traders started with the same endowment of 10 shares of
each asset, 5000 units of cash (denoted in “Taler”), and 5000 Taler as a
loan, which had to be repaid at the end of each trading round. We chose
to give subjects sufficient cash such that the no-borrowing constraint was
unlikely to be binding.9 However, relative to the fundamental value of assets,
the cash endowment was still much lower than in some of the experiments
in the literature (see e.g. Lei et al., 2001). Thus, if we observe bubbles in
the current experiment, we would expect to see even more bubbles with a
higher cash endowment. Short—selling of assets and borrowing of extra cash
was not possible.
Assets paid only a final dividend, which implies that fundamental values
were flat. This dividend d was the sum of a base value, distributed uniformly
between 50 and 90, and a supplement. It was common knowledge that in
each round one of the 5 assets was endowed with a supplement of 80 and one
with a supplement of 40. The remaining assets carried no supplement. Thus,
ex ante without any further information about supplements, the expected
value for each asset was given as
E(d) = expected base value + expected supplement = 70 +
40 + 80
5
= 94.
Note that regardless of the information or beliefs about supplements, the
expected value of the market index, which is defined as the average price of
all 5 assets, is constant at 94.10
3.2 Treatments
There are three treatments which differ with respect to the information
subjects receive about supplements and with respect to the opportunity to
8The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, forthcoming). The program kept track of a queue of offers (the order book)
but only the standing offer was visible to subjects. Own offers could be seen in a separate
window. They could be withdrawn if they were not the standing offers.
9 In fact, in the experiment cash balances of subjects fell below 150 in only 0.13% of
cases (subject-trading day combinations).
10Note that this implies that “good news” about one asset is always “bad news” for the
remaining ones. This need not always be the case in reality. However, one can always
interpret information about a supplement as differential information, i.e. by how much
better the information is for asset x compared to those for asset y.
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Table 1: Treatments
NOINF INF INFCHAT
number of indep. sessions 6 6 6
number of rounds per session 3 3 3
traders per session 10 10 10
probability of inside information 0 0.5 0.5
opportunity to chat no no yes
chat with other traders.
• Treatment NOINF is a control treatments in which subjects receive
no private information about supplements. There is no opportunity
to chat with other traders.
• In treatment INF, with probability 1/2, one trader is informed about
the amount of one of the supplements and the corresponding asset
label. There is no opportunity to chat with other traders.
• In treatment INFCHAT the information structure with respect to
supplements is the same as in INF. Additionally, subjects have the
opportunity to chat with other subjects on a computer interface. The
chat is free-format and visible to all subjects. Chatters’ comments are
identified only through a pseudonym. Additionally, they are marked
by the chatter’s current wealth, which is calculated as the value of the
chatter’s portfolio at the most recent prices plus cash.11
Table 1 summarizes the treatment properties. Although our design intro-
duces a number of innovations, it is easy to connect our NOINF treatment to
earlier studies in a logical way. The main design differences between NOINF
and earlier studies are the number of assets and the (recurrent) payment of
dividends (see Table 2). Most earlier studies were conducted with one asset
and recurrent dividend payments after each treading day. However, Fisher
11The last feature was implemented to account for Shiller’s (2005) idea that stock rec-
ommendations of a neighbor who drives up with his brand new Mercedes may carry more
weight.
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Table 2: Placement of NOINF relativ to the literature
dividends no dividends
1 asset
Smith et al. (1988)
find bubbles
Smith et al. (2000)
find no bubbles
> 1 asset
Fisher/Kelly (2000)
find bubbles
NOINF
and Kelly (2000) also find bubbles when two assets are traded simultane-
ously. Thus, there is no evidence that bubbles are influenced by the number
of assets. However, there is already evidence that dividends influence bub-
bles. Smith et al. (2000) and Hirota and Sunder (2005) find hardly any
bubbles in markets with only a final dividend. Given this evidence, the
hypothesis for our NOINF treatment, which combines more than one asset
with no dividends, is that there are no bubbles. Taking this as our point of
departure, we add further features that are omitted from the usual labora-
tory experiments but which are often present in real financial markets where
bubbles are being observed. Those features are the possibility of inside infor-
mation (in treatment INF) and, additionally, the possibility to communicate
(INFCHAT).12
3.3 Timing
Each experimental session consists of three rounds plus one practice round.
Prior research shows that bubbles tend to disappear with experience in the
same market (see e.g. Dufwenberg et al., 2005). Thus, we chose three
rounds in order to examine whether bubbles still appear in later rounds
when subjects have more experience. The practice round has the purpose of
familiarizing subjects with the trading platform. Payoffs from the practice
round are not counted towards the final earnings.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events for each round. At the be-
12A logical step might have been to complete a 2x2 design by having a treatment
NOINF_CHAT. However, after observing the results from our first three treatments,
we expect no interesting results since there are already very few bubbles in NOINF, and
chat seems to be counterproductive for bubble formation.
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drawing of
dividends
morning:
chat
day 2
...
morning:
chat
day 10
info about 
supplement 
given
(if any)
afternoon:
trading
day 1
noon:
prediction
(on days
4, 6, 8)
afternoon:
trading
afternoon:
trading
prediction
of
rank
noon:
prediction
(on days
4, 6, 8)
noon:
prediction
(on days
4, 6, 8)
Figure 1: Sequence of events during one round
Note: There are three rounds plus one practice round.
ginning of each round subjects are asked to rank themselves among the 60
subjects of a treatment in terms of payoffs for this round. Then, dividends
are determined randomly and independently of earlier rounds.13 Subjects
start with the same initial endowment for each round. In treatments INF
and INFCHAT with probability 1/2 one subject is informed about one of
the supplements.
The practice round consists of 3 trading “days” and no subject receives
information in practice rounds. The actual three rounds consist of 10 trading
days each. A “day” is divided into morning (only for treatment INFCHAT,
not on day 1), noon (only on days 4, 6, and 8), afternoon, and evening. The
morning lasts for 60 seconds, in which subjects can use the chat platform.
At noon subjects are asked to give predictions for (1) prices of all assets
at the end of this day and (2) the dividends of all assets at the end of the
round. In the afternoon the double auction market opens for 120 seconds.
In the evening each subject is informed about the number of shares he owns
of each asset, the most recent price of each asset, the value of his portfolio
at the most recent prices, and his available cash and credit. Also subjects
see 5 charts with all transaction prices of the respective asset from day 1 up
to the current day.
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to fill in a different ques-
tionnaire with some demographic data and questions with respect to their
trading strategy. Finally, we ask subjects to answer 6 questions designed to
test their knowledge about financial markets (see Appendix).
13The sequence of random draws was determined beforehand and was the same for each
session in order to make sessions more comparable.
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3.4 Experimental procedures
Experiments were conducted in the summer of 2006 in the experimental lab-
oratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim. In each session 10 traders, recruited
via an online recruiting system, participated. Six sessions were conducted
per treatment. Subjects were undergraduate students from business, eco-
nomics, and social sciences. Sessions lasted for about 3 hours and average
pay was about 30 Euros.
At the beginning of the experiments, printed instructions (see Appendix)
were handed out. Special care was taken to insure that subjects understood
the simple calculations for the expected final dividends. In fact, all pos-
sible cases (with or without private information) were explained to them
by examples (“If you know that certain asset receives a supplement of 40,
the expected dividend for this asset is 70 + 40 = 110 Taler and for each
remaining assets it is 70 + 80/4 = 90 Taler.” etc.).
We used a powerpoint presentation to familiarize subjects with the trad-
ing screen. After subjects read the instructions, they had to pass several
review questions in order to make sure that they had understood the market
structure (see Appendix).
4 Experimental results
The main question this paper is trying to answer is whether bubbles can
occur in asset markets when there are no recurring dividend payments but
when instead we add two features that are present in real financial markets.
The simple answer is “yes”. However, only one of the features suggested
by Shiller (2005), namely the possibility of inside information or “stories”,
seems to be responsible for bubbles. We shall elaborate on this in the next
subsection.
Subsection 4.2 deals with the influence of overconfidence on bubble for-
mation. Subsection 4.3 presents some preliminary evidence why communi-
cation via chat may, contrary to our expectations, prevent bubble formation.
Finally, in Subsection 4.5 we take a look at the tactics of informed traders.
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4.1 Bubble count
In this section we shall describe the frequency of bubbles in our experiment.
For this we first need to specify a definition of bubbles. The usual definition
of bubbles as “persistent deviation from fundamentals” is useful but needs
to be operationalized. Also, given that in two of our treatments private
information may be present, a distinction between bubbles and mirages (see
Camerer and Weigelt, 1991) is necessary.
• A mirage is said to occur if prices are substantially above fundamental
value, although they could be justified by information on a supplement
but, in this case, are not. To be precise, we call a sequence of prices
a mirage if the median daily price of an asset satisfies the following
condition for at least three consecutive trading days:
1. The median price is closer to 94, which is the fundamental value
without information, than to 110, which is the expected value of
an asset given knowledge that it carries a supplement of 40.14
2. There is, in fact, no information about a supplement in the market
(i.e. the fundamental value is 94).
• An asset bubble is said to occur if prices deviate substantially from
fundamental value and this deviation cannot be justified by any pos-
sible information on supplements. To be precise, we call a sequence of
prices an asset bubble if the median daily price of an asset is above 150
or below 80 for at least three consecutive trading days. Note that 150
is the expected dividend of an asset if it is known that the supplement
is 80. If it is known that an asset carries no supplement, the expected
dividend is 80.
Asset bubbles are unlikely to occur in our experiment as it will be rare
that an observed price cannot be justified by any information on supplements
14Analogously, one can define an 80-mirage, if prices are closer to the expected value
given an 80-supplement than to the expected value given a 40-supplement (or to 94).
However, we did not find any instances of such mirages for at least 3 trading days.
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(given that the supplements can be fairly large relative to the base value of
an asset). But the same is, of course, true for real asset markets. It will be
rare that an observed price movement cannot be justified by any plausible
story.
Our design with 5 assets has the advantage that we can differentiate
between bubbles for a single asset and market bubbles which describe an
over- or undervaluation of the entire market.
• Amarket bubble is said to occur if the prices index of the whole market
deviates substantially from fundamental value. Note that as pointed
out above, the fundamental value for the market index is 94. Thus,
we call a sequence of price index values a market bubble if the average
of median prices for all 5 assets deviates from 94 by more than 10%
for at least three consecutive trading days.
Table 3 reports the frequencies of bubbles according to the above defi-
nitions. We report the total number of bubbles and the number of rounds
(out of 18 possible), in which at least one bubble occurred. A clear pattern
emerges: In treatment INF, mirages and market bubbles are more frequent
than in the other two treatments and occur in (almost) two thirds of the
rounds.15 Surprisingly, mirages and market bubbles are as rare in INFCHAT
as in NOINF (no significant differences according to Mann—Whitney U—Tests
(MWU) for any bubble measure). As expected, asset bubbles are rare in
all treatments. Nevertheless, 5 asset bubbles occur in treatment INF but
none in treatments NOINF and INFCHAT.16 The total number of trades
per session is highest on average in NOINF and lower in INF and INFCHAT.
However, this difference is not significant according to a MWU test on the
session level at any conventional significance level.
To conduct a more disaggregated test for the determinants of bubbles we
ran several random effects probit regressions. The variable to be explained is
15 If we conservatively consider entire sessions as units of independent observations, we
get significant differences at the 5% level of a one—sided MWU tests for the differences
between INF and INFCHAT for the number of mirages, number of market bubbles, and
number of market bubbles rounds. Between INF and NOINF the difference is significant
for number of market bubble rounds. All other pairwise tests are not significant at the
13
Table 3: Frequency of bubbles
number of bubbles
bubble type NOINF INF INFCHAT
mirages n.a. 23 8
market bubble 4 14 3
asset bubble ( 0 ) 5 0
number of bubble rounds
bubble type NOINF INF INFCHAT
mirages n.a. 12 / 18 5 / 18
market bubble 4 / 18 11 / 18 3 / 18
asset bubble ( 0 / 18 ) 3 / 18 0 / 18
avg. number of trades per session 1585.7 1509.3 1244.7
Note: A mirage or bubble is counted as such if the respective price deviation is observed
for at least 3 consecutive trading days.
in all cases the probability that a given round is a round in which a market
bubble occurs. The explanatory variables in all regressions are dummies
for the treatments INFCHAT and NOINF (with INF being the default),
a variable “financial knowledge”, which measures the average number of
correct answers on a financial knowledge questionnaire given by the group
of traders for the current session, a variable “male” which represents the
share of males in the group, a dummy for students who are in the upper
division of their undergraduate studies (last 2 years), and variables that
represent the share of traders in the group who study one of the fields:
economics, business, law, (natural) sciences. Since the three rounds of a
session cannot be considered independent, we use standard errors that are
clustered by session. Furthermore, we allow for heteroscedasticity in the
error structure.
The first column of Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the respec-
tive variables for this base model. Both treatment dummies are significant
5% level.
16The definition of an asset bubble is not really applicable to NOINF. The frequency
is reported here nevertheless to show that extreme price deviations were rare in this
treatment.
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and negative, which confirms the impression from the non-parametric tests
above. The probability of a market bubble in NOINF is 35% lower than
in INF. For INFCHAT it is 34% lower than in INF. Surprisingly, market
bubbles, are more likely in rounds when the share of economics and law
students is high.
Columns 2 contains a further regression which enriches the base model
by including a variable measuring how frequently the shortsale constraint
was binding. Camerer et al. (1999) introduce the notion of an information
trap. A market is in an information trap if traders cannot conduct arbitrage
due to either (1) a lack of cash or (2) a lack of assets to sell in the pres-
ence of shortsale and no-borrowing-constraints. Since we provided subjects
with sufficient cash (partly through a loan), the no-borrowing constraint
was never binding for any of our subjects. To account for the shortsale con-
straint, we construct the variable “shortsale” by taking the average number
of asset/day/subject combinations in which a trader had zero of an asset
in his portfolio at the end of a day (i.e. when the short-sale constraint was
binding).17 Table 4, column 2 shows that the shortsale constraint does not
significantly increases the probability of bubbles. Apparently, the shortsale
constraint is not responsible for bubble formation, which is consistent with
the findings of Haruvy and Noussair (2006).
Finally, column 3 contains another regression including an (over)confidence
indicator “top-rank belief” (to be explained below). This also does not affect
the results substantially. However, (over)confidence seems to be a possible
factor for bubble formation and we shall address this topic in the next sec-
tion.
With respect to experience we find in contrast to most of the literature
(e.g. Boening et al., 1993, or Dufwenberg et al., 2005) that bubbles are ro-
bust to repeated experience in the same market and with the same traders.
When we aggregate over all treatments, we find that there are 4 market bub-
bles in first round, 7 market bubbles in second round, and 8 market bubbles
17The mean of the shortsale variable is 0.066. Note that the theoretical maximal value
for this measure is 0.9 as at least one trader must hold assets.
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Table 4: Probit analysis: probability of a bubble round
Explanatory variable:
prob. of bubble round
Base model
with
shortsale
with
confidence
INFCHAT −0.342∗∗ −0.288∗∗ −0.324∗∗
(0.130) (0.111) (0.130)
NOINF −0.354∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗
(0.137) (0.137) (0.133)
financial knowledge −0.791 −0.726∗ −0.727
(0.509) (0.400) (0.545)
male 0.053 0.012 0.003
(1.146) (0.908) (1.209)
upper division 0.154 0.201 0.314
(0.561) (0.456) (0.608)
economics 2.896∗∗ 2.917∗∗ 2.772∗∗
(1.096) (0.999) (1.089)
business −0.477 −0.155 −0.299
(0.651) (0.618) (0.749)
law 4.778∗∗∗ 4.645∗∗∗ 4.678∗∗∗
(1.291) (1.211) (1.321)
sciences 2.385∗ 2.303∗ 2.305
(1.091) (0.900) (1.144)
shortsale 0.725
(0.559)
top-rank belief 0.171∗∗
(0.092)
Observations 54 54 54
Log-Likelihood −20.519 −19.150 −19.945
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.443 0.420
Note: Reported are marginal effects at the mean. ∗∗∗ significant at 1%-level;
∗∗ significant at 5%-level; ∗ significant at 10%-level; Standard errors in
parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered by session;
a constant is included in all regressions
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in third round. One difference of our experiment to the aforementioned ex-
periments, that could account for this observation, is that our markets are
repeated with a slight variation in each round. The assets with supplements
(and the information about these) change from round to round. We believe
that this (probably realistic) feature may inhibit learning by subjects and
makes them susceptible to bubble formation over and over again.
The number of mirages also does not decrease with experience. Aggre-
gated over INF and INFCHAT we get 7 mirages in round 1, 10 in round 2,
and 14 in round 3. If anything, the number of mirages seems to increase
with experience. This is in clear contrast to the observation by Camerer and
Weigelt (1991) who find hardly any mirages in later rounds. There is a sim-
ple explanation for this difference, though. In Camerer and Weigelt (1991)
there is competition among insiders which forces them to trade early and
aggressively lest their informational advantage is lost to the other insiders.
This produces a particular trading pattern that became easy to notice by
uniformed traders. In our design with a monopolistic insider, in contrast, an
insider can patiently wait to exploit his informational advantage (see Section
4.5).
4.2 Overconfidence and bubble formation
Overconfidence of investors is widely believed to be a cause for irrational
pricing patterns on financial markets (see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001),
although the exact mechanism by which it affects prices in markets is still
under debate. To measure overconfidence in our experiment, we asked sub-
jects before the start of each round (and before private information about
supplements was given) to rank themselves among the 60 subjects of a treat-
ment in terms of payoffs for this round. Overall, overconfidence in our ex-
periment seems to be modest as 54 % of subjects thought to be better than
the median, i.e. have rank 30 or better, which is significantly more than
the expected 50% (at the 5% level of a one—sided binomial test) but not
dramatically so. An interesting phenomenon, however, can be observed for
subjects who believe that they are going to make the top-rank among 60
subjects. One out of 18 subjects thought that he is going to be top-ranked
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although only one out of 60 can actually be top-ranked. The existence of
traders who are particularly over-optimistic with respect to top-rank may
be important as those subjects may be the most active traders,18 possibly
causing bubbles.
To test this we constructed a variable “top-rank belief” which measures
for each round the number of subjects who believed they would be top-
ranked. Column 3 in Table 4 reports a regression that includes this top-
rank belief variable and, indeed, it has a positive and significant effect on
the probability of bubbles.
Figure 2 shows the top-rank belief variable aggregated over sessions for
the different rounds and treatments. In contrast to the expected number of
top-ranked traders, which is 1, the numbers are much higher in INF and they
are increasing from round 1 to 3. Overconfidence is lower in NOINF but
is also increasing with experience. All circled value are significantly above
the theoretical value of 1 according to one—sided binomial tests with a p—
value of 0.02 or better. In contrast, overconfidence is low (not significantly
different from 1 at any conventional significance level) and does not increase
in treatment INFCHAT. This points to an interesting and unexpected role
chat may play in our experiment, namely to make traders more realistic
with respect to their trading abilities.
4.3 Why is chat counterproductive for bubble formation?
Our original hypothesis that chat should be conducive to bubble formation
is clearly rejected by the data. What could account for this? There may
be several ways by which chat prevents bubbles form being formed. As
we saw in Section 4.2, chat seems to reduce (or, at least, to prevent an
increase in) overconfidence. We also found evidence that links overconfidence
to bubble formation, which establishes one possible explanation for this
counterintuitive result.
There are two further ways in which chat may prevent bubbles.19 Chat-
18 In fact, traders who believed that they would be top-ranked made on average 2.41
trades per day and asset in contrast to 1.90 trades of those who did not believe this.
19Chat may also prevent bubbles by giving subjects something to do rather than trading
18
Figure 2: Overconfidence and experience: Number of traders who believe
that they are going to make top-rank, aggregated over sesions.
Note: Circles indicate significant differences to expected value according to one-
sided binomial test with p-values < 0.02.
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Table 5: Chatting in bubble and non-bubble rounds
bubble rounds mirage rounds
yes no yes no
average number of messages per round 53.7 108.3 65.2 115.3
average number of chatters 4.0 6.0 4.1 6.2
share of messages by insiders∗ .20 .07 .15 .07
number of rounds 3 15 5 13
Note: Data from treatment INFCHAT. ∗Includes only rounds with insiders.
ters may point out overvalued market situations to other traders. And chat-
ters may explain the mechanics of the market to others. We find anecdotal
evidence for both types of communication.
Before analyzing the content of chat messages, we present in Table 5
a first quantitative view on the relation between chat behavior and the
occurrence of bubbles. Simply counting the number of messages and number
of chatters, one sees a clear difference between market bubble and non-
market bubble rounds (respectively, mirage and non-mirage rounds). In
bubbles rounds, only about half as many messages are exchanged and they
are sent by fewer subjects than in non-bubble rounds. However, the share of
messages sent by insiders is about twice as high in bubble rounds. Although
it is impossible to infer from this a causal link between chatting behavior
and bubbles, we see a correlation between fewer chat messages and more
bubbles. When no chat messages are allowed, as in treatment INF, we find
even more bubbles.
By definition market bubbles occur because some assets are traded above
the expected value while the prices of others do not drop accordingly. If the
price increase in one asset is backed by hard information (i.e. inside infor-
mation), the market bubble must be driven by other assets not adjusting
downwardly. Alternatively, the price increase is not backed by hard infor-
mation. In this case, the bubble is driven by one or more asset bubbles.
This second type of market bubble is more fragile in the sense that once the
when they shouldn’t. However, we find no significant relationship between the number of
chat messages a subjects sends and the number of his trades.
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asset bubble bursts, the market bubble bursts, too. Which type of chat can
eliminate which type of market bubble?
The first type can be eliminated if a chatter points out the inconsistency.
This happened indeed in one round. The market correctly identified the
asset with the supplement of 80. One chatter commented that this implies a
lower value for the other assets and despite a high price for that one assets,
no market bubble materialized. In fact, even in later rounds of the same
session no market bubble occurred.
The second type of market bubble is less likely to occur if traders have
doubts in the persistency of the asset bubble. Comments in this respect
indicate that there is at least one trader who considers the asset to be over-
valued which makes it more likely that the bubble may burst. A respective
comment may act as an external trigger to burst the bubble. We find several
instances in which chatters use the terms “overvaluation” or “overvalued”.
However, there are not enough observations to warrant a statistical analysis.
4.4 Price predictions and revelation of information
An important question with respect of bubble formation is whether traders
realize that assets are overpriced or not. If treaders realize that current
prices are far above fundamental values, they may still speculate on rising
prices in the short run (“ride the bubble”). The alternative hypothesis is
that traders simply do not recognize the mispricing. In order to separate out
those two hypotheses we have asked our subjects to predict both, the price
of an asset at the end of the current trading day and the final dividend after
the last trading day (i.e. the fundamental value). Subjects were asked to
make those predictions for all 5 assets at “noon” of days 4, 6, and 8. Thus,
for each round we have up to three predictions per subject.20
Figure 3 shows the average predictions of subjects in all treatments sepa-
rately for rounds in which a positive market bubble occurred and for rounds
20The predictions were voluntary and no monetary incentive was given. Subjects had
up to 60 seconds for typing the predictions in. Some subjects provided nonsensical pre-
dictions in order to speed up the process (the most frequent nonsensical prediction was
0). Therefore, we eliminated all predictions below 50 and above 170 from the analysis.
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Figure 3: Average predictions of prices at the end of the current day and of
final dividends in market bubble and non-market bubble rounds.
Note: Aggregated over rounds, sessions, and treatments. Vertical bars show 95%
confidence intervals.
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in which no positive market bubble occurred. Interestingly, predictions for
the final dividend are fairly close to the expected value of 94, which is the
fundamental value for the market portfolio. In no-bubble rounds predictions
for the price of assets at the end of the day are also close to 94. However, in
bubble rounds, predictions for prices at the end of the day are substantially
higher. This finding is more in line with the hypothesis that traders try to
ride the bubble while being aware of the fact that a crash must occur in the
end of a round.21
Does information eventually get revealed through prices? This question
is at the heart of the literature on rational expectation and the informational
role of prices. In a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
all information in the market gets revealed through prices. On the other
hand, game—theoretical models would predict a No-Trade Theorem. Finally,
theories based on imperfect competition among informed traders (see e.g.
Kyle, 1989) predict only a partial revelation of information. In our context,
there is a monopolistic insider who clearly should be aware of the fact that
his actions influence prices and may eventually reveal his information.
In Table 6 we list the fully revealing REE prices given that an asset is
endowed with a supplement of 80 or 40 and one trader is informed about
this. In the table “info about supplement” is denoted as 0 if no information
about supplements is known in this round. Info about supplement is −x
if it known that another asset receives a supplement of x. Note that the
REE predictions were explicitly explained to subjects through examples (see
Appendix). Table 6 compares the REE predictions to the median of the final
prices in all rounds with the respective supplement information.
Interestingly, the final prices on rounds in which an asset is known to
have a supplement of 80 are fairly close to the fully revealing price of 150.
However, with a supplement of 40, final price hardly differ from the no-
information expected value of 94. Median final prices in rounds without
any information are 98 and even exceed those with a supplement of 40.
The possibility of mirages is probably responsible for this. Noteworthy is in
21However, traders may misjudge when exactly a crash will occur. Haruvy et al. (2006)
show that beliefs are adaptive, and crashes are rarely anticipated correctly in early rounds.
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Table 6: Comparison of final prices to REE prices
info about supplement 80 40 0 −40 −80
REE prediction 150 110 94 90 80
median of final prices in rounds 140 95 98 91.5 93.5
number of observations 16 4 170 16 64
Note: Info about supplement is 0 if no information about supplements is known in this
round. Info about supplement is -x if it known that another asset receives a supplement
of x.
particular, that there is very little downward adjustment for asset without a
supplement when there is information that another asset has a supplement.
Median final prices are particularly far off from the REE prediction of 80
when the asset is known not to carry the 80 supplement.
4.5 Tactics of the informed trader
The decision problem of an informed trader is not simple. Clearly he wants
to avoid revealing his information too early. He may even try to mislead
other traders by first selling the asset he has positive information on. Or he
may trade first in other assets to draw the attention of traders away from
the asset he is informed about. In this section we shall have a closer look at
the tactics our informed traders employed.
In their first trade of a round, none of the informed traders sold the
asset which they knew carried a supplement of 40 or 80. Instead, 50% of
informed traders placed a limit order to buy the asset with the supplement,
20% placed a market order to buy the asset with the supplement, and the
remaining 30% traded in other assets in their first action of a round.
We are also interested in who placed the first limit order in a round for
an asset, about which inside information was available. Plott and Sunder
(1982) and Barner et al. (2005) find that inside information often gets
revealed by insiders placing limit orders early in a round. Furthermore, in
rounds in which bubbles or mirages happen, Barner et al. (2005) find that
the uninformed were placing limit orders. In our data, in 5 of 20 cases
the informed traders were the first traders to place a limit order for the
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asset they were informed about, which amounts to only slightly more than
their share among all traders. Interestingly, in 4 of those 5 rounds a market
bubble occurred, which is not in line with Barner et al. (2005).
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the informed traders’ portfolio. The
upper two panels show the evolution of the insider asset (i.e. of the asset
about which insiders had information), for a supplement of 40 and for a
supplement of 80, respectively. The mean number of shares in the portfolio is
slowly increasing over all 10 days starting from the endowment of 10 shares.
In the end, informed traders held on average between 40 and 50% of the 100
outstanding shares. The lower panels of Figure 4 show the evolution of the
insiders’ portfolio with respect to the four assets, which they knew did not
carry a supplement of 40 or 80, respectively. Given this knowledge, insiders
should have sold those assets at any price above 80 or 90, respectively. Figure
4 shows that this indeed occurs when insiders knew that the four assets did
carry the 80-supplement (x = −80) as average holdings are down to about 5
per asset. Surprisingly, average holding for the x = −40 case are U-shaped.
At the end of the round, insiders are back to their initial endowment on
average. Note that bargain prices for these assets cannot account for this
behavior since prices are higher than the REE prediction (see Table 6).
Figure 5 shows the time and the price of limit order bids made by insiders
for the asset they were informed about, separately for different supplements.
While there are many bids just above 94, which shows that insiders try
to carefully collect their portfolio without giving away their information,
towards the end of the round, insiders feel the need to place higher and
higher bids. In the case of the 40-supplement, some bids approach the fully
revealing price 110. In the case of the 80-supplement all bids are below 150
but reach 140. Interestingly, there is a high frequency of prices at or slightly
below 110, which hints at bids “masquerading” as bids for an asset with a
40-supplement.
The trading pattern of insiders and outsiders also differs substantially
with respect to frequency and the distribution of trades over the 10 days of
a round. Figure 6 shows the average number of limit bids per day per asset.
The right panel shows average number of bids by informed traders for the
25
Figure 4: Evolution of average holdings by insiders of the asset insiders
were informed about (upper two panels) and of the average holding of the
remaining 4 assets (lower two panels)
Note: Dotted line at 10 denotes the initial endowment. A supplement of -x means that
these assets do not carry a supplemt of x.
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Figure 5: Timing (in seconds) and prices of limit bids by insiders to buy
insider assets.
Note: Aggregated over rounds, sessions, and treatments. Dotted lines denote fun-
damentals values without information (94), with information about 40-supplement
(110) and with information about 80-supplement (150).
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Figure 6: Number of limit bids per day per asset for insider assets by insiders
(right panel) and for other assets by all traders (left panel).
asset they are informed about (“insider assets”). The left panel shows the
same for all assets which are not known to carry a supplement. Overall there
are a lot more bids placed for insider assets than for other assets. Insiders
place bids with high frequency in the early days, slow down somewhat and
then again place many bids on the final day. Uninformed traders on the
other hand, show a declining activity with respect to bids throughout all 10
days. This trading pattern makes intuitively sense. Insiders try to profit
from their private information by buying early but not too aggressively.
Once prices start to rise, insiders and outsiders slow down. But insiders buy
again on the last day in order to exploit any remaining profit opportunities.
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Finally, we shall consider how insiders make use of their private informa-
tion in terms of profits. Over all rounds and treatments, the median profit of
insiders was 1,126 Taler per round. A fairly extreme benchmark is the profit
an insider would make against totally naive, uninformed traders who believe
that prices are uninformative and the fundamental value of each asset re-
mains at 94 regardless of trading prices. Against naive traders, an insider
would buy all outstanding shares of the asset with the supplement at a price
of 94 and would sell all of his other assets at a price of 94. A simple cal-
culation using the actual dividends paid in our experiment (see Appendix)
shows that average profits of insiders would then be 14,274 Taler.
If there is no information about supplements in a given round, expected
profits are equal to expected dividends of all assets plus cash, which amounts
to 9,885 Taler, where we use the same dividend base values as above to make
a fair comparison. Accordingly, insiders capture only 31.3% of their possible
informational rent.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we report results of an experiment designed to test whether
bubbles in asset markets occur even when only a final dividend is being
paid (and consequently, the fundamental value for each asset is flat). This
question is motivated in part by the vivid description of bubbles in Shiller’s
book “Irrational Exuberance” which stands in marked contrast to the rel-
atively austere environment which characterized prior experiments on asset
bubbles.
All prior experiments in which bubbles were observed, paid out divi-
dends after each trading day. In our base treatment NOINF, we confirm
the implicit hypothesis derived from this observation, namely that frequent
dividends are the driving force for bubble formation in experimental asset
markets. Without them, hardly any bubbles can be observed.
However, bubbles undoubtedly do occur in real markets despite the ab-
sence of dividends, for example in stocks that never paid dividends or in
commodities or currencies. To account for this fact we test in this exper-
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iment Shiller’s (2005) idea that bubbles may be driven by an interplay of
inside information and communication among traders.
Our main result is that bubbles can frequently occur even in the absence
of recurrent dividend payments. As hypothesized, the possible presence of
inside information is crucial for bubble formation. In our treatment INF we
observe market bubbles and mirages in almost 2/3 of rounds. Furthermore,
there is no indication that bubbles disappear with experience. The latter
result may be due to the fact that the labels of assets with supplements
change from round to round. Arguably, this feature is typical for real fi-
nancial markets. While at one time a bubble occurs in internet stocks, at
another time bubbles may occur in solar energy stocks or in the housing
market. We also find a significant effect of overconfidence on the formation
of bubbles: the higher the number of traders in a group who believe that
they are the best traders, the more likely it is that bubbles form.
In contrast to our expectations, the option to communicate via a chat
platform has the effect of reducing the number of bubbles almost to the
level of our NOINF treatment without inside information. We suggest some
hypotheses why this may the case, but clearly further research is needed to
study this unexpected effect.
By collecting data on the beliefs of traders about future prices and div-
idends, we are able to distinguish between speculation and confusion, a
distinction which has relevance for theories of rational vs. irrational bub-
bles. In particular, we find that most subjects are well aware of overpricing
when it occurs.
Finally, our design makes it possible to study the intriguing question how
traders with insider information behave. We find no evidence that insiders
actively try to mislead other traders, either through chat or their trading
behavior. However, they try to hide their information by not talking about
it in the chat and by trading non-aggressively. Insiders have much higher
trading volumes and slowly accumulate shares of the asset they are informed
about such that in the end of the round they hold between 40 and 50% of
the outstanding shares. However, they do not fully disinvest with respect
to the remaining assets which may partly explain why they fall short of
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achieving the maximal informational rent. In the end of a round, prices
reveal fairly well the identity of assets endowed with a supplement, which
supports the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) prediction. On the
other hand, prices insufficiently adjust downwards when it should be known
that an asset does not carry a supplement.
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Appendix: Translation of instructions
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. They
are the same for every participant. Please do not talk with other participants
and remain quite during the entire experiment. Please switch off your mobile
phone and do not switch it back on until the end of the experiment. If you
have any question, raise your arm and the experimenter will come to you.
The experiment is about trade in assets. Apart from you there are nine
other traders in your group. The composition of the group does not change
during the entire experiment. You can trade different assets with the other
traders. All transactions will be in terms of “Taler”. All Talers you earn
are converted to Euros at a rate of 1,000 Talers = 1€ at the end of the
experiment and paid out to you in cash.
The experiment consists of three rounds. At the beginning, there is a
short practice round. During this practice round you can familiarize your-
self with the situation and the program. All transactions during the practice
round have no consequences on your payoffs. The experiment will last for ap-
proximately 3 hours, including time for instructions and the practice round.
Description of a round
There are five different assets, which can be traded. At the beginning of
each round you receive 10 units of each of the five assets and 5,000 Taler in
cash. Additionally you receive 5,000 Taler as a loan, which you have to pay
back at the end of the round. At the end of each round, each asset pays a
dividend. This dividend is paid to the trader who owns the asset at the end
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of the round. How the dividend of an asset is determined will be explained
below.
Your total payoff for each round consists of the dividends of your assets
plus your cash holdings minus the loan of 5,000 Taler. Note that an asset is
worth nothing after the dividend has been paid.
Each round consists of 10 “days”. In the “morning” of each day (except
day 1) you have the opportunity to anonymously communicate with the
other traders via computer (chat) [This sentence for INFCHAT only]. At
“noon” you are sometimes asked to fill in a questionnaire in which you
predict the asset prices and dividends that you expect. In the “afternoon”
the market opens and you are able to start trading assets. In our experiment
the “morning” is one minute long, “noon” lasts for up to 60 seconds and the
“afternoon” for two minutes. In the “evening”, you see charts of the asset
price developments from the first up to the present day. The round ends
after the tenth day.
We will soon distribute an extra sheet, which will explain how to trade
assets using the computer program.
Dividends
The dividend for a given asset consists of two components: the base
value and a supplement:
DIVIDEND = BASE VALUE + SUPPLEMENT
The base value is chosen at random before each round and is an integer
between 50 and 90 Taler. All integers are equally likely to occur. So, the
expected base value amounts to 70 Talers. No trader knows the actual base
value.
For the supplement, two of the assets are selected randomly at the be-
ginning of each round. All assets have the same chance of being selected.
One of the selected assets gets a supplement of 80 Talers, the other gets a
supplement 40 Talers. All assets not selected receive a supplement of zero.
So if you don’t know which assets are selected [This clause for INF and IN-
FCHAT only], the expected supplement will be (80+40+0+0+0)/5 = 24
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Taler. The expected dividend is equal to the sum of the expected base value
and the expected supplement: 70 + 24 = 94 Taler.
Note that the actual dividend can lie anywhere between 50 and 170 Taler.
No trader knows the actual dividend [This sentence for NOINF only].
With a probability of 1/2, nobody will learn anything about the supple-
ments. With the remaining probability of 1/2, exactly one trader will get
additional information. All ten traders have the same probability of being
drawn. If you are drawn, you will learn one of the two selected assets and
its supplement. No other trader has this information. However, you will
not learn the base value of this asset or which other asset has been selected.
This information is not known to any other trader, either. [This paragraph
for INF and INFCHAT only]
Examples: [for INF and INFCHAT only]
If you know that a given asset receives a supplement of 40 Taler but you
don’t know which asset gets a supplement of 80 Taler, then the expected
dividend...
... of the asset with the supplement of 40 Taler is: 70 + 40 = 110.
... of each of the other assets is 70 + (80 + 0 + 0 + 0)/4 = 90.
If you know that a given asset receives a supplement of 80 Taler but you
don’t know which asset gets a supplement of 40 Taler, then the expected
dividend. . .
... of the asset with the supplement of 80 Taler is 70 + 80 = 150.
... of each of the other assets is 70 + (40 + 0 + 0 + 0)/4 = 80.
Timing
Let’s recall the timing of the experiment. At the beginning there is a
practice round that lasts only three days. Then, the first round starts, which
affects your payoff. Each round consists of 10 days and unfold as follows:
At the beginning of each round, dividends are determined randomly.
These dividends are valid for the entire round but completely independent of
the dividends paid in other rounds. There is a 50% chance that a randomly
chosen trader is then informed about the supplement of one asset [This
sentence for INF and INFCHAT only]. Then ten days follow, each of which
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consists of a “morning” with communication [This clause for INFCHAT
only], a “noon” at which you sometimes have to make forecasts, and an
“afternoon” with trading.
Practice 
Round Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Information about 
supplement:
dividend = base 
value+supplement is 
determined
Dividend is paid
Information about 
supplement:
dividend = 
value+supplement is 
determined anew
Information about 
supplement:
dividend = 
value+supplement is 
determined anew
Dividend is paid Dividend is paid
[Figure: “information about supplements” not for NOINF]
Bankruptcy
Please be aware that you have to pay back your 5,000 Taler loan at the
end of each round. If you are not able to pay your debts, your payment for
the present round will be zero and you will have to quit the experiment.
Overall Payment
Your overall payoff from the experiment equals the sum of the payoffs
from all three rounds.
Review questions
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
1. Each of the three numbers 3, 6 and 9 is likely to occur with probability
1/3. What is the expected value?
2. You bought an asset for 80 Taler, which receives a dividend of 90
Talers. Suppose you keep it until the end of the round, how much
profit did you make by buying this asset?
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3. Assume you have 1,000 Taler in cash at the end of the round and the
dividend paid to your assets is 4,100 Taler. Are you bankrupt and do
you have to quit the experiment? Yes______ No_____
4. You have 100 units of one asset and 1,000 Taler in cash and you make
no transactions until the end of the round. How large is your dividend
at least? ______ Taler
Which payoff will you receive at least at the end of the round (note,
that you still have to pay back the loan of 5,000 Taler)? ____ Taler
5. You are at the beginning of a round. How likely is it that one trader re-
ceives additional information about the supplement.
______ Percent [This question for INF and INFCHAT only]
6. You were informed which asset receives the 80 Taler supplement. Has
any other trader been informed about supplements as well? ______
Yes ______No
How high is the dividend for this asset?
At least ______ Taler and no more than_______ Taler. [This
question for INF and INFCHAT only]
5. Can it happen that some other trader knows more than you about
the base value or about the supplements at the beginning of a round?
______ Yes ______No [This question for NOINF only]
Financial market questionnaire
[The following 6 questions (true/false/uncertain) were asked at the end of
the experiment to assess subjects’ knowledge about financial markets]
1. I have already bought or sold stocks myself.
2. When buying shares of an American company, you bear the risk of a
changing exchange rate.
3. To go short means to sell shares without holding them.
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4. At a stock exchange each buyer has to deposit an agio to prove that
he has enough liquidity.
5. Profit taking explains why stock prices tend to slightly decrease during
an uptrend without any obvious reason.
6. IPO is an international authority monitoring the placement of new
securities on the stock markets.
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Table 7: Calculation of expected profits of insiders against naive traders
insider buys all 90 shares with known
supplement at price of 94 from naive traders
−8460
insider sells all his 40 shares without
known supplement at price of 94 to naive traders
3760
assets with known supplements paid on average a
dividend of 139.74 in our exp., insider holds 100 shares
13974
sum 9274
plus cash 5000
total profit 14274
This needs to be contrasted with the profit when no trader is informed,
which turns out to be 9885, when we use the same dividend base values as
above to make a fair comparison. Thus, through their information, insiders
could earn a rent of 14274 − 9885 = 4389. However, they manage only to
extract a gain of 1375 (= 11260 − 9885) or 31.3% of their informational
rents.
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